This paper presents a simple model of wage bargaining and employment ows designed to address the eects of policies to increase the rate of exit to employment of the long-term unemployed. Exit rates from long and short-term unemployment have two eects on the unemployment rate: a positive one as high exit rates strengthen current employees' bargaining positions and thus wages and a negative one as faster outows from unemployment reduce the stock of unemployed. Thus, there is a trade-o between the exit rate from long-term unemployment and the exit rate from short-term unemployment. The paper's principal result is that, in steady-state, increasing the exit rate from long-term unemployment reduces the unemployment rate. Dynamic simulations show that raising the exit rate of the long-term unemployed leads to a decrease in both the mean and variance of the unemployment rate.
Introduction
The persistent high rate of long-term unemployment is perhaps the European Union's most serious economic problem and it is made all the more so by the well-known pattern of declining exit rates from unemployment as duration rises: those unemployed longest are the least likely to obtain employment. It is hardly surprising, then, that many European economists and policy-makers have been proposing policies aimed at increasing the exit rate to employment among the long-term unemployed. Examples of such policies include job training and placement programs for the long-term unemployed, as recommended by Layard (1997) , and targeted employment subsidies, as proposed by Snower (1997) .
The most obvious criticism of these policy recommendations is that they can merely obtain jobs for the long-term unemployed at the expense of the short-term unemployed, and so increase the rate of outow from long-term unemployment at the expense of increasing the inow. Proponents, however, have usually countered such criticisms with two arguments. Firstly, it is argued that increasing the employability of the longterm unemployed weakens the bargaining power of current employees and thus reduce wages and increases the numberof jobs. 1 Secondly, as Layard (1997) has pointed out, if government policies can make the long-term unemployed more employable without making the short-term unemployed less so, then they can increase the overall rate of outow from unemployment and so, holding the rate of inow constant, such policies can reduce the stock of unemployed. This paper presents a simple but general model for analyzing the eects of policies which increase the exit rate to employment of the long-term unemployed. It focuses on the dual role which exit rates play in determining the unemployment rate: directly through their eect on employment o ws and indirectly through their eect on wages.
Wages are determined through a bargaining mechanism between the employer and the employee in which the employer needs to pay a wage which depends upon the employee's \outside option", usually represented as the expected present discounted value of earnings while short-term unemployed. The most obvious example of such a bargaining mechanism is the Shapiro-Stiglitz model of eciency wages, but modelling wages as a function of employees' outside option has been a feature of almost all modern models of wage determination, including the Nash bargaining model of Layard and Nickell (1986) . This approach, however, provides a simple counterpoint to the view that increasing the exit rate from long-term unemployment m ust create jobs by directly reducing wages. This is because wages are an increasing function of both short-term and long-term exit rates: raising either strengthens bargaining positions by increasing workers' outside option. Thus, holding all else equal, an increase in the exit rate from long-term unemployment raises wages and thus unemployment. This paper's principal result, however, is that in steady-state equilibrium, policies which increase the exit rate from long-term unemployment do reduce the unemployment rate. Why? Because once we raise the exit rate from long-term unemployment, we cannot hold \all else equal": with an unchanged exit rate from short-term unemployment, these policies would also act to reduce the stock of unemployed by increasing the overall rate of outow. Since this is incompatible with an increase in wages, labor market interventions which succeed in increasing long-term exit rates must do so at expense of reducing short-term exit rates and we show that they do so in a way that reduces wages and the unemployment rate.
The previous papers which are most closely related to this work are Shapiro and Stiglitz's (1984) model of eciency wages and Blanchard and Diamond's (1994) discussion of the eect on wages of employer hiring rules which rank applicants by unemployment duration. The model in this paper shares the Shapiro-Stiglitz model's focus on the dual role of exit rates, aecting the unemployment rate indirectly through wages and directly through ow eects. However, while we calibrate an eciency wage version of the model for illustrative purposes, this paper's results do not depend on other specics of the eciency wage model. Blanchard and Diamond compared wages determined by a Nash bargaining rule for two cases, one in which rms ll vacancies by choosing applicants randomly and one in which rms hire the applicant with the shortest unemployment duration. Their results showed that, for the same steady-state unemployment rate (which was independent of the wage level), wages were higher under durational ranking than under random hiring. Blanchard and Diamond's model featured an exogenous unemployment rate and allowed for comparison of wages under two specic rm hiring rules and under specic assumptions concerning matching between vacancies and the unemployed. The model in this paper, however, has an endogenously-determined unemployment rate and its results are very general. 2 The contents of the paper are as follows. Section 2 outlines the basic structure of the model and Section 3 presents the principal results. Section 4 extends the model to account for labor heterogeneity and also looks at out-of-steady-state simulations. These show that increasing the exit rate of the long-term unemployed leads to lower peak levels of unemployment during recessions, faster recoveries and a lower average unemployment rate over the business cycle. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
Setup
Time is discrete. The economy has a xed labor force normalized to 1.
Firms: There is a continuum of rms whose mass is also normalized to 1. All rms produce a homogenous good with price equal to one according to identical technologies, with each rm having a concave production function. There is no physical capital and we will start the analysis with the assumption that labor is homogenous. Thus, the production function is of the form AF (L) where A is a productivity parameter. In Section 4, we allow for the more realistic assumption of heterogenous labor inputs.
Labor demand is determined by F 0 (L) = w where w is the wage level.
Wages: Workers are risk-neutral and wish to maximize the expected present discounted value of income using discount rate (1 + r) 1 . Wages are determined in a bargaining process in which the wage level depends positively on workers' \outside option", the expected present discounted value of being short-term unemployed, V S , as well as on other variables inuencing wage bargaining which we will label z: w = g (V S ; z ). For illustrative purposes, we will use a simple extension of the Shapiro-Stiglitz eciency wage model as a specic example of such a bargaining process.
Separations: There is an exogenous separation process in which a fraction b of each rm's workers become unemployed each period. 3 Exit Rates: At the end of their rst period of unemployment, workers at time t obtain employment for the next period with probability a St . If they do not obtain employment at the end of their rst period, they become long-term unemployed. Once long-term unemployed they have exit rate a L t+k at time t + k. These exit rates determine two values for the unemployment rate, one through their eect on wages and thus labor demand and one through their direct eect on the stock of unemployed. Thus, the set of feasible values for these exit rates will be restricted by the necessity for these two generated unemployment rates to be equal. However, this one restriction on the two-dimensional set of possible exit rates still leaves a one-dimensional continuum of feasible exit rate combinations: which combination is observed can be inuenced by government policies to reduce duration dependence.
Note that our assumption concerning exit rates is a very general one: it is merely a statement that there are separate exit rates for long and short-term unemployed. If skill loss during unemployment, declining search i n tensity with duration, or employer hiring rules which rank applicants by duration are important, then these exit rates will decline with duration. It is important to note, however, that there is an extensive empirical literature on the question of whether the duration dependence observed in aggregate exit rates is due to \genuine" duration dependence (as an individual's unemployment spell lengthens, her probability o f exit from unemployment decreases) or labor heterogeneity (individuals with dierent characteristics have dierent exit rates and so the long-term unemployed consist disproportionately of those with low exit rates). That heterogeneity is an important inuence on average exit rates is beyond doubt. It is well known that long-term unemployment rates dier by education and other observable characteristics. However, despite the large empirical literature on this topic, there appears to be little agreement on the relative importance of heterogeneity and genuine duration dependence. 4 Thus, we do not make a n y assumption concerning whether exit rates display \genuine" duration dependence. However, our results below do imply that the size (although not the sign) of the eect on the unemployment rate of increasing exit rates from long-term unemployment depends upon how m uch duration dependence there was to start with: in other words, duration dependence aects the unemployment rate in a nonlinear fashion.
Exit Rates and the Outside Option
Consider now the determination of the value of employees' outside option, the value of being short-term unemployed, V S . Dene V E as the expected present discounted value of income obtained while employed. Without loss if generality, we will assume that earnings while unemployed equal zero. The expected present discounted values of earnings while in short and long-term unemployment at time t are given by
(1)
Repeated substitution of these formulas, together with a bargaining equation linking wages and thus V E to V S , yields a formula linking V St to positively to current and future exit rates: 
Inserting this into equation 3 gives us
So given the denition of w we have
Dierentiating this gives
This result makes the simple point that those currently employed will not always prefer policies which act to increase a S to those which act to increase a L . Which exit rate current employees prefer to see raised will depend upon the variable w which in turn depends negatively on both short and long-term exit rates: the numerator term (1 a S ) represents the fact that the higher a S is the less important a L will become while the denominator term (r + a L ) 1 describes the eect of an increase in a L once a worker has failed to exit short-term unemployment. When w > 1 long-term unemployment becomes a likely enough state for short-term unemployed individuals to nd themselves in, perhaps for a numberof periods, and so they care more about increasing the value of this state than they do about becoming re-employed next period.
Example: Eciency Wages
One example of wage determination which is consistent with our assumptions is the Shapiro-Stiglitz model of eciency wages, extended to include separate exit rates for short and long-term unemployed. Workers obtain ow utility w when shirking and w e when not shirking. Each period there is a probability b that a worker will lose her job and, independently, imperfect monitoring of workers implies an additional independent probability q that workers who are shirking are caught and red. The asset equations characterizing the expected present discounted value of utility obtained while shirking and not shirking are, respectively:
where V S is the value of being in short-term unemployment. Wages are always set so that V sh E = V E : w t = r 1 + r V S t +1 + ( r + b +) e (6) Assuming workers do not shirk the steady-state value of being employed is.
V E = 1 + r r + b ( w e ) + b r + b V S
Inserting equation 6 i n to equation 7 and re-arranging we get V E = V S + (1 + r) e q (8) So, together the parameters r; e and q determine the extent of \insider power" which imperfect monitoring gives workers. 
Note that now the parameter w not only represents the relative eects of a S and a L on wages but also becomes a sucient statistic for their eect. 5 
Exit Rates and Unemployment Dynamics
We h a v e described how future exit rates can aect the unemployment rate by inuencing the bargaining position of workers and through this wages. Thus at time t a high value of a St tends to produce high unemployment. However, once we reach time t + 1 this high value of a St will tend to produce low unemployment because it has contributed directly to reducing the stock of unemployed individuals. More precisely, changes in stock of unemployed will be given by
where L is employment, U S is the number of short-term unemployed and U L is the number of long-term unemployed. Given the assumption that U St = bL t 1 we get a second-order dierence equation in U t
Thus the unemployment rate at time t is a function of all past exit rates and initial unemployment U = U f a S t 1 ; a L t 1 ; a S t 2 ; a L t 2 ; a S t 3 ; a L t 3 ; ::::; b; U 0 ; U 1
The steady-state solution to equation 10 is given by
or, dening a new variable
Note that since, in steady-state, (1 a S ) U S = a L U L , the proportion of the unemployed who are in long-term unemployment is given by 1 + f . Equation 12 describes a monotonic relationship between U and 1+ f . Thus, unless policies to increase the rate of exit from long-term unemployment can reduce the total stock of unemployed, they cannot aect the proportion of that stock who are long-term unemployed.
Along this steady-state unemployment s c hedule the eects of exit rates are:
These results make the intuitive point that for a given rate of inow into unemployment, the higher are the rates of exit from unemployment then the lower the stock of unemployed will be. They also give u s a counterpart to Result 1. Clearly, this will have an innite space of solutions. We pin down a unique equilibrium path for exit rates and unemployment by specifying a rule a St = h t (a Lt ) which determines the pattern of duration dependence.
Characterizing the set of feasible steady-state equilibria consists of nding the set of (a S ; a L ) combinations which give us
There is a continuum of possible solutions (a S ; a L ) to this equation and an equation
describing the relative structure of the exit rates is required to pin down a unique equilibrium. We can now investigate the properties of the set of feasible solutions to this equation.
3 Properties of Steady-State Equilibria Equation 13 describes the determination of steady-state equilibrium unemployment. Are there are any important dierences between the dierent possible solutions to the equation. In particular, does a reduction in the extent of duration dependence reduce the equilibrium unemployment rate? Our main result shows that it does.
Unemployment and Exit Rates
Firstly, it is clear that there is a trade-o between a S and a L . 
as required. represents the innum of the set of feasible unemployment rates, b = 0:04166 was chosen to give this a value of :04. The values of r; e and q together imply a value of 0:75 for V E V S . This is consistent with V E being between 20% and 21% higher than V S . Thus, the simulations describe an economy which cannot have unemployment lower than 4% and in which workers have signicant insider power. Figure 1 shows the set of feasible combinations of a S and a L . The graph shows a strong, almost exactly linear, pattern of declining a S as a L gets larger. Repeated simulations show that this essentially linear pattern occurs for all sets of exogenous parameters. It can beeasily shown that an increase in e or r will shift this schedule of feasible exit rates upwards, while an increase in A or q shifts it downwards. Thus, whatever rule is determining the relative structure of exit rates to close the model, an increase in e or r will result in higher unemployment and at least one exit rate being lower while an increase in A or q will have the opposite eect. 6 We can now show that anything which increases the exit rate of the long-term unemployed will in fact decrease the equilibrium unemployment rate. So, increasing the long-term exit rate reduces the equilibrium unemployment rate as long as workers discount future earnings. The result holds because the relative size of the long-term exit rate's eect on the stock of unemployed through raising outows is always larger then the relative size of its eect on wages. Even when an increase in a L has a stronger eect on wages than an increase in a S , this can only bethe case if there are more long-term unemployed than short-term unemployed and so the ow eect outweighs the wage eect: an increase in a L always requires a sucient fall in a S to reduce wages.
Quantitative Importance
We have shown that reducing duration dependence in exit rates can reduce the unemployment rate. However, when is the eect quantitatively important? Technically, what we are interested in is the partial derivatives of dU da L with respect to parameters of interest. Unfortunately these derivatives are very complicated and unsignable analytically. However, simulating the eciency wage model, the size of the eect can be easily understood in terms of the term driving the result:
If the function d (a S ; a L ; r ) equals zero then duration dependence has no eect on unemployment. Note then that the eect of a S on this function is negative and linear, the eect of a L is negative and convex and the eect of r is positive and convex. 7 This implies that the magnitude of duration dependence's eect on unemployment depends negatively on exit rates: the more exogenous parameters, such as those inuencing insider power, are set so that the unemployment rate is high and exit rates are low, the stronger will be the eect of duration dependence. We can see this from These results have t w o implications. Firstly, policies to reduce duration dependence will have their greatest impact on unemployment in economies such as those in Europe 7 More specically
which currently have high unemployment. Secondly, the potential for a decline in the unemployment rate from policies to increase long-term exit rates will depend positively on the current extent of duration dependence. The simulations show however that the likely impact on unemployment of policies to increase the exit rate of the long-term unemployed is a small one. While bringing duration dependence down from very high rates reduces the unemployment rate by multiple points, Figure 2 shows the eect of moving the dierence between long and short-term exit rates from the more realistic value of 0.3 to -0.3 is 0.6 for e = 0:25 (9.4% to 8.8%) and 0.3 for e = 0:22 (7.4% to 7.1%). Repeated simulations show that for all reasonable parameterizations of duration dependence and the unemployment rate, the eect is below one percentage point.
Extensions
Two questions can beraised about the results just derived. Firstly, given the obvious empirical importance of labor heterogeneity, can we draw m uch from an analysis based on homogenous labor? Secondly, are the insights gained from the steady-state results useful when thinking about an economy with business cycles? This section looks at these issues in turn.
Labor Heterogeneity
A standard way t o i n troduce labor heterogeneity is to assume that diering types of laborenter into the production function in diering fashions. This result holds because segmented labor markets imply that the eects of type-i exit rates on wages are exactly as before: an increase in i implies higher w i for constant L i . Thus the eects of increased duration dependence are similar to the standard results for the eects on factor demand of an increase in a factor price and so unsurprising.
The implications of heterogenous labor can be seen from simulating this model. Specically, the model was simulated using separate eciency wages for each category of labor under the assumptions that the supply of each equals 0.5 and technology is CES 
and so an increase in duration dependence in category i will increase in unemployment in both categories with the eect on category j being very small. However, because is small the eects of i on L j turn out to bevery small. Thus, the dominant eect on unemployment of an increase in i is the decrease in L i . Figure 3 shows the unemployment rate for skilled and unskilled categories as we increase both 1 and 2 .
This approach produces an interesting cross-sectional counterpart to our earlier result that policies to increase long-term exit rates have their strongest eects in depressed economies. Figure 3 shows that policies to increase the long-term exit rate have their strongest eect among the low-wage, high-unemployment category, with the explanation being analogous to the cross-country argument a b o v e.
Out-of-Steady-State Dynamics
The results derived thus far indicate that, for an economy in steady-state, policies to increase the exit rate of the long-term unemployed will lead to lower unemployment. While obviously suggestive, these results may h a v e limited applicability to the real world since real economies cannot be characterized as displaying steady-state behavior: we are thus interested in how duration dependence aects an economy which goes through cyclical uctuations.
Keeping the simple assumption that a S = a L + the time path for exit rates and thus unemployment is obtained by solving the N simultaneous non-linear equations U f a S t 1 ; a S t 2 ; a S t 3 ; :::::; a S 0 ; ; U 0 ; U 1 = U w a S t +1 ; a S t +2 ; a S t +3 ; ::::::::: t = 1 ; 2 ; ::::N for the N variables a S 1 ; a S 2 ; ::::; a S N supplying the initial conditions a 0 and U 0 as well as the terminal value for V S N+1 (and thus U N ). It is clear that there will be no analytical solution to these equations and so we need to apply numerical simulation methods. The model was solved using the Fair-Taylor algorithm for the solution of rational expectation models (Fair and Taylor, 1983) . Calculating moments over all time periods of the simulation, we nd that the dierence between mean unemployment rates is almost exactly equal to the dierence between steady-state rates when evaluated at the mean of the A process: this indicates that, despite the complexity of the model, the steady-state analysis still provides a useful baseline. The economy with duration dependence also has a higher variance for unemployment: 1.56 percentage points as opposed to 1.24. Figure 4 shows that the dierence between the two economies is most pronounced during and after recessions with the duration dependence economy having higher peak values for unemployment. This economy has a higher variance for unemployment because during booms it has very similar levels of unemployment t o the random hiring one.
Deterministic Business Cycle: The model has also been simulated with A displaying a deterministic cyclical pattern in which it equals 1 plus a sine wave with amplitude 0:02 and a cycle of 10 periods. Figure 5 shows the time-line unemployment using a 20 period sample. The results show that the economy with duration dependence moves more quickly to peak unemployment during recession and experiences a higher peak level of unemployment: in the depicted simulation, peak unemployment is 1 point higher.
During the recovery period, the decline in unemployment i s s l o w er in the economy with duration dependence: the largest dierence between the two unemployment rates, 1.5 points, occurs 4 periods after peak unemployment. Once the economy moves into its boomperiod, however, the duration dependence economy experiences a lower level of unemployment at the bottom of the cycle: there is one period at the bottom of the cycle in which unemployment is a half point lower than the random hiring economy. Again the duration dependence economy has a higher average unemployment rate over the business cycle with the dierence being close to the dierence between steady-state rates evaluated at A = 1 .
Conclusion
This paper has shown how policies directed towards increasing the exit rate of the long-term unemployed can reduce total unemployment and that this result holds very generally. Sensitivity analysis of the results shows that the size of this eect depends positively on the rate of time-discounting, the current level of duration dependence and also on any structural variables which aects the unemployment rate positively. An implication of this result is that policies to increase long-term exit rates will bemost eective in economies such as those in Europe which h a v e structural factors underlying high unemployment and large numbers of long-term unemployed with low levels of labor market attachment. A cross-sectional implication is that policies directed at reducing duration dependence will be most eective in reducing unemployment when targeted at low-skill, high unemployment groups.
It must be noted, however, that simulations indicate that for realistic parameter values, the steady-state eect of these policies are small: certainly less than one percentage point. Finally, the out-of-steady-state simulations show that even for economies in which the steady-state gains from eliminating duration dependence are small, the effects on the cyclical behavior of unemployment can be substantial: the simulations suggested that economies with duration dependence have higher peak levels of unemployment, slower recoveries and higher average unemployment o v er the business cycle.
A Omitted Proof 
